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In many developed economies wage inequality has risen considerably in the last
quarter of the twentieth century. An interesting facet of this observed rise in
inequality is the role of skill diﬀerentials. For example, the wage premium in
the US for college graduates relative to high school graduates rose from 1.35
in 1975 to 1.5 in 1985 to 1.75 in 1995 — despite increases in supply of college
graduates. During the recent decade the skill premium seems to have stagnated,
but remains at a much higher level than in the early 70s. Figure 1 (Autor, Katz
and Kearney, 2004) shows the trends in income inequality and in particular the
college-high school wage gap since 1963. As the ﬁgure highlights, the bulk of
the increase took place between 1979-1992. To reconcile an increasing relative
price with expanding relative supply, a suﬃciently large increase in relative
demand is required. Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992)
drew attention to the important role of the “demand” for more educated and
skilled workers in driving these patterns. Kreuger (1993) suggested that the
advent of the computer has had a role to play in these changes. This initial
research gave rise to the extensive literature on skill biased technical change
(henceforth, SBTC). The empirical literature has also been accompanied by a
large theoretical literature on both the origins and consequences of SBTC, e.g.
see Acemoglu (1998), Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000) and Galor and
Tsiddon (1997).
A major stumbling block, however, for theories that rely on accelerating
technological change is the contrary and equally well documented observation
that major developed economies in the world experienced what is commonly re-
ferred to as “the productivity slowdown” during the same period where the skill
premium soared. The productivity slowdown is usually attributed to a decline
in total factor productivity (TFP), primarily in the service sector. Moreover,
the recent surge in growth witnessed in e.g. the US economy from 1995 onwards,
have not been associated with an increasing skill premium. That is, even though
“computerization” (the usual indicator of skill biased technical change) has ac-
celerated during the same nineties (Autor, et. al., 2004). Interestingly, recent
research indicate that increasing TFP growth in the service sector, possibly
associated with computerization, may be responsible for reversal of the dismal
growth performance of the 70s, 80s and early 90s (Bosworth and Tripplet, 2002).
1Figure 1: Source: Autor, Katz and Kearney (2004)
2In this paper we present a simple model which is capable of bringing these
facts together in a coherent way. That is, an increasing skill premium being
associated with a deceleration in growth, in turn caused by weak underlying
productivity growth in service occupations. More precisely, the theory builds
on two fundamental elements.
The ﬁrst element derives from the work of Wallis and North (1986), who ar-
gued for a fundamental distinction between “transaction activities” and “trans-
formation activities”. Whereas transformation activities are those related to
the actual production of goods, such as work on an assembly line, transac-
tion activities are not. Transaction activities are costs associated with run-
ning/maintaining the ﬁrm and selling the goods. Accordingly, obvious examples
include legal departments, accounting, marketing, the human resource depart-
ment and so on. Even within manufacturing the share of total employment
deriving from such occupations has risen considerably. Wallis and North docu-
ment that it increased from 15% to 38% during the period 1870-1970.
We model this distinction in a simple way by assuming that transaction
and transformation activities are combined, in some ﬁxed relation, to produce
output. Accordingly, both “tasks” are necessary to produce ﬁnal output.
The second element derives from the work of Baumol (1967), who argued
that services is a technologically backward sector. Observing the close link
between Wallis and Norths’ concept of ”transaction activities”, and the more
conventional notion of “services”, provides the motivation for assuming that
transaction activities tend to be less productive, in the sense of total factor
productivity (TFP), than transformation activities.
Against this background, and unlike in other macroeconomic theories, we es-
sentially employ the notion of Baumol’s (1967) curse as part of an explanation
for the increasing wage inequality. A temporary drop in TFP in transaction ac-
tivities causes the productivity slow down. Both in terms of income per worker,
and in terms of aggregate TFP. Moreover, as long as the skill intensities in
transformation and transaction activities are suﬃciently dissimilar, with trans-
actions being more skill intensive, such unbalanced growth (even if temporary)
will have long term consequences for wage inequality. In particular a slowdown
in TFP in the transaction activities will increase the wages of skilled labor more
than the wages of the unskilled sector.
Whereas the work of Baumol (1967) suggest that transaction activities ul-
3timately may be less productive than transformation activities, one may argue
that computers have led to surge of TFP growth within transaction activities
(Bosworth and Tripplet, 2002). In this case, our model predicts a reversal of
growth and inequality trends; a surge in growth accompanied by a falling, or at
least unaltered, skill premium.
Our long run intention is to calibrate the model to match the US data for the
last three decades of the twentieth century. In particular it matches better the
main challenges that proponents of skill biased technological change face. That
is: (a) the productivity slowdown coincided with increasing inequality in wages;
(b) The post 1995 productivity resurgence has, if anything, coincided with a
possible stabilization of wage inequality; (c) the increasing recognition by labor
economists that occupational inequality may be as important as educational
based wage inequality in explaining what happened over the past few decades
(Eckstein and Nagypal, 2004).
The model is extended to consider the implications of changes in the produc-
tions function’s parameter (i.e. the seriousness of Baumol’s curse), endogenous
skill formation and occupational choice. We next discuss the evidence on service
sector and the general evidence on TFP growth.
2 The Productivity Slowdown and the Service
Sector
The fact that labor productivity in the US went through an extended slow-
down from 1973-1995 is now well universally documented and despite several
attempts to correct for possible measurement errors. Despite a number of hy-
potheses, there does not exist yet a satisfactory answer for what happened.
Indeed one such hypothesis presented by SBTC advocates is the fact that the
introduction of new technologies led to an extended period of “adjustment” dur-
ing which skills increase in demand leading to both a slowdown and an increase
in inequality. Greenwood and Yorokoglu (1997) is an example of this kind of a
theory. Thus both features of the past 25 years can be explained. One might
wonder though if it takes 25 years to learn a new technology. In this section
we review the evidence on the productivity slowdown and in particular the role
of the service sector. The existing literature is very large and as in any other
research, there is considerable diagreement amongst the researchers as there are
4Figure 2:
ways of measuring the slowdown. Steindel and Stiroh (2001) provide a useful
summary of the state of the literature. Table 1 below corresponds to Table 2 in
their paper. The table presents estimates made by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics and two well inﬂuential studies, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner
and Sichel (2000). If one focusses on the fourth row which informs us of the
growth rate in labor productivity it is evident from these that a sharp upswing
took place post 1995 and more importantly this was accompanied by a sharp
upswing of total factor productivity (in addition to capital deepening).
The obvious question that arises for our hypothesis is what exactly happened
to the service sector vis a vis the rest of the economy. The observation that
service sector in particular recorded low productivity growth during the period
of productivity slowdown has been at the center of this literature for a long time.
Jorgenson (1996) notes that the manufacturing sector did quite well. To see the
diﬀerence consider Table 2 (taken from Steindel and Stiroh (2001)). The table
shows the pre productivity slowdown growth and also lists the manufacturing
sector’s estimates. Conﬁrming Jorgenson’s observations there is little evidence
that manufacturing actually went through much of a slowdown- given that non
farm business sector’s growth rate did decelerate this must mean that most of the
decline actually did take place in the service sector. Thus the frequent reference
to “Baumol’s Disease” in the literature. Recent work for example by Tripplet
and Bosworth (2001) continue to dcument this despite attempting to correct for
measurement errors. Further Steindel and Stiroh (2001) note that since most of
the service sector’s output is actually an intermediate input, it is unlikely that
the mismeasurement itself can create signiﬁcant mismeasurement issues at the
5Figure 3: Average Productivity Growth Rates: 1959-99 (Steindel and Stiroh
(2001))
aggregate level. Finally as Tripplet and Bosworth (2001), argue, it is diﬃcult
to reason why the service sector should have suddenly seen mismeasurement
appear in 1973.
The next observation that we document is the acceleration of service sector in
MFP. This is best documented in recent work of Tripplet and Bosworth (2002)
where they forcefully argue that service sector MFP accelerated after 1995.
Further they note that the most intensive adopters of information technologies
have been the service sector industries during this period. Thus the revival of
MFP growth has coincided with growth in the service sectors leading them to
argue that Baumol’s disease has been cured.
The ﬁnal piece of evidence that we would like to present is related to the
skilled ratio of the service sector relative to manufacturing. A critical assump-
tion of our story is that service sector is more skill intensive compared to the
rest of the economy (in particular manufacturing). Is this a valid assumption.
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Figure (2) presents some supporting evidence based on educational attainments.
We deﬁne the unskilled as anyone with a high school degree or less. The ﬁgure
lists the ratios for various subsectors of the economy in 2001. We list the two
main non agricultural and non service sectors- manufacturing and construction
and a number of service sectors and the overall service sectors. As can be seen
from this diagram, that in the service sector around 65% of the population
has some college or more. In the manufacturing sector, the share is 50% and
in construction it around 35%. There are of course disparities within the ser-
vice sector- more traditional sectors like trade and transportation are more like
manufacturing while the rest are not. Within manufacturing there is much less
discrepancy with only electronics and chemicals sectors showing a very high skill
intensity. Overall our assumption of the diﬀerences in skill ratios seem valid.
73 A Simple Model
We are considering a closed economy, time is continuous and extends into the
inﬁnite future. The economy produces a homogenous good which can be either
consumed or invested. The market for the ﬁnal good and production inputs are
competitive.
The labor force comprises both skilled and unskilled labor. The relative
supply is exogenous and constant over time. The labor force itself grows at the
constant rate n.
Households save a constant fraction of their income s each period. Accord-
ingly, wage inequality, which arises in equilibrium, will not matter for the rate of
capital accumulation. In this way we are able to focus on the impact of growth
in technology on the evolution of the skill premium, and income per worker.
The details are given below.
3.1 Production
The representative ﬁrm produces output, Y , by combining two distinct tasks:
transaction activities, T, and transformation activities, P ,i naﬁxed relation
γ.T h a ti s
Y =m i n( P,γT). (1)
Equation (1) captures that ﬁnal goods are created by combing both explicit
production activities (P), like assembly line work, with service activities of var-
ious kinds (T). The latter represents the combined contribution from divisions
within ﬁrms, such as the legal department, accounting, marketing, the human
resource department and so on. The Leontief speciﬁcation is adopted so as to
capture that both activities are essential for the procurement of ﬁnal goods.
Accordingly, we assume that the creation of 1 unit of ﬁnal good requires the
combination of 1 unit of transaction activities and γ units of transformation
activities.
Within speciﬁc tasks substitution of inputs is possible. More speciﬁcally,
transactions are produced with the following technology involving skilled labor









8We assume Ap grows over time at the exogenous rate g,a n dt h a tAT/Ap ≡ a
is constant. Inspired by the work of Baumol (1967) we will assume that the
technology used in transaction activities tend to lag that of transformation ac-
tivities. Baumol’s argument was more extreme, in that he argued that services,
many of which are isomorphic to Wallis and North’s notion of transaction ac-
tivities, are asymptotically stagnant. That is, technology does not expand in
the limit. For present purposes we shall only assume that transaction activities
tend to lag transformation activities, and explore the consequences of changes
in the relative level of technology. In concrete terms we assume that
AT (t)=Ap (t − τ) ⇔ AT (t)/Ap (t)=a = e−gτ,
where τ is the time lag between adoption of a technology in transformation
activities and adoption of the same technology in transaction activities.
An important aspect of the production technologies is the assumption that
transaction activities uses skilled workers relatively intensively. We believe this
is a plausible assumption consideringt h et y p eo fp r o c e s s e sw eh a v ei nm i n d
here — legal work, ﬁnancial services and so on. To ﬁx ideas we invoke the
extreme assumption that transformation activities only involve skilled labor,
transformation activities only unskilled labor.
Assuming that capital is fully mobile across activities within the ﬁrm, we
may proceed by deriving the allocation of capital across “tasks”. Using equation











By deﬁnition, the total stock of capital is given by the sum:
K = Kp + KT. (5)
Using equations (4) and (5) we have that the fraction of the ﬁrms total stock of



















The interpretation of this expression is simple. If AT rises relatively to Ap,
capital ﬂows into transformation activities, so as to maintain P = γT. If ﬁnal
9goods production becomes less transaction intensive, an upward shift in γ,t h e n
capital also ﬂows into transformation activities.
With this information we can write down the reduced form production tech-














w h e r ew eh a v ei n v o k e dY = P along with equation (6). Observe that the re-
duced form production technology exhibits constant returns to scale in Ls,L u,K
combined. Compensation of capital and labor thus exhausts total output.
The ﬁrm chooses Ls,L u and K so as to maximize proﬁts Y −wsLs−wuLu−
rK subject to the reduced form production technology, equation (7). The factor
prices are respectively: ws,w u and r. The ﬁrst order conditions are





















































Accordingly, capitals’ share is constant through time, and given by 1−η. Labors
share is also constant, at η. But the composition of these outlays changes as
AT,A p γ and the number of skilled and unskilled changes.























where N represents the total labor force, which decomposes into skilled and
unskilled laborer.
N = Ls + Lu.
3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium arises when the relative supply of skilled and
unskilled labor equals relative demand. Invoking the ﬁrst order conditions from














Thus, changes in relative technology in transaction and transformation activities
will manifest itself in changing relative demand for skilled labor. Imposing the
assumption that the relative supply of the two types of labor is constant over








we have the following equilibrium result
Proposition 1 Skill premium and relative technological change. Deﬁne
the skill premium as ω ≡ ws/wu. (i) ∂ω/∂τ > 0.( ii) ∂ω/∂γ < 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from diﬀerentiation of equation (10).
The intuition for this result should be transparent. If τ goes up (a decreases)
capital ﬂows into transaction activities so as to ensure P = γT. Since capital
and labor are complements, the marginal productivity of the labor input used
intensively in transactions, Ls, rises. In other words, the associated increase in
KT/K is suﬃciently large so as to compensate for the fact that a fell to begin
with. Equation (6) makes this clear — a reduction in a of 1 percent leads to
an reduction in Kp/K of 1/(1 − η) > 1 percent. This is what generates the
increase in relative demand for service labor, that is, skilled labor.
Ar e d u c t i o ni nγ produces the same pattern of an intensiﬁed allocation of
capital for transaction purposes. This sort of a structural change in the produc-
tion process will therefore also impact on the skill premium.
3.3 Capital Accumulation


















, for X = Y,K. Moreover, assuming households save a
constant fraction of income, then the capital stock per eﬃciency unit is given
by











i1−ηk−η ≡ G(k;a,λs,λ u)
, g = ˙ Ap/Ap = ˙ AT/AT, while n is the rate of labor force growth. The phase
diagram for this model is for practical purposes identical to the one of the Solow
model. The economy gradually approaches a unique (non-trivial) steady state,





























In steady state the economy grows at the constant rate of exogenous technical
change, g/η. Obviously, any change in s,τ,λi i = s,u or n, will generate a
change in the level of productivity in the long run, and thus be associated with
a temporary change in growth in income per worker as the economy adjusts.
Therefore, of particular interest are changes in the adoption lag, τ,a sw e l la s
the structural parameter γ. Factors that also matter for the evolution of wage
inequality. We have





































































Hence, if τ increases (a ≡ AT/Ap declines) Income per worker declines. Chang-
ing γ is a completely symmetrical exercise.
The phase diagram depicted in Figure 1 shows this result geometrically for
a scenario where τ rises (a declines) or γ increases (transaction intensity rises).
If a declines the long run level of income per worker shifts down. In tran-
sition therefore, growth in income perw o r k e rd e c l i n e s . B yP r o p o s i t i o n1w e
12Figure 5: Phasediagram and eﬀects from changing a and γ.
k n o wt h a tt h es a m ec h a n g ew i l le n t a i la nincreasing skill premium. Hence, if
the productivity of transaction activities declines relative to transformation ac-
tivities the economy will simultaneously experience rising wage inequality, and a
(temporary) productivity slowdown. The productivity slowdown will in fact be
associated with aggregate TFP, suitably deﬁned. To see this, note that equation


























It now follows that






∂TFP/∂a > 0 and ∂TFP/∂γ > 0.
13Proof. Diﬀerentiation yields immediately the result.
In other words, the model predict that if transaction activities fall further
behind transformation activities in terms of A, a productivity slowdown sets in.
Both in terms of aggregate TFP and income per worker. In addition, the skill
premium rises.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an argument that suggests a causation from
the decline in the productivity growth to the increase in wage inequality. The
argument relies heavilly on the inter sectoral diﬀerences on skill ratios, in par-
ticular the diﬀerence between the skill intensities of the service sector and the
manufacturing sector. Moreover our hypothesis also matches the record in the
nineties of rising productivity in the service sector and stabilizing wage inequal-
ity. However an important question remains, why did the more skill intensive
sector of the economy experience an elongated period of productivity slowdown
while the relatively unskilled sector not experience such an elongated period of
productivity slowdown? This is clearly a central question that remains to be
answered.
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